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Japan’s commitments to the UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were the largest contribution
the country has made in the history of its international peace operations. Notably, Japan’s participation in
the peacebuilding operations in East Timor was based on “human security” as one of the pillars of its
diplomatic policy. Moreover, Japan’s participation in the peace operations in East Timor was a touchstone
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timeline “sequence analysis” as a research method which combines and simplifies analytical models
suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of sequence analysis, this paper investigates
four stages of Japan’s contributions to the peace operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment
(UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement (INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g.
UNMISET). The findings of this research reveal to what extent Japan’s commitments to the peace
operations were consistent and for human security of East Timor.
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A Sequence Analysis of International Peace Operations:
Japan’s Contributions to Human Security of East Timor
Daisuke Akimoto
Abstract
Japan’s commitments to the UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were the largest
contribution the country has made in the history of its international peace operations.
Notably, Japan’s participation in the peacebuilding operations in East Timor was based on
“human security” as one of the pillars of its diplomatic policy. Moreover, Japan’s
participation in the peace operations in East Timor was a touchstone issue for its human
security policy. Yet, one simple but important question arises. How consistent were Japan’s
commitments to the peace operations? In an attempt to answer to this question, this paper
systematically examines Japan’s contributions to the international peace operations for East
Timor. In order to investigate long-term and complicated activities in the peace operations,
this paper employs timeline “sequence analysis” as a research method which combines and
simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of
sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan’s contributions to the peace
operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement
(INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISET). The
findings of this research reveal to what extent Japan’s commitments to the peace operations
were consistent and for human security of East Timor.
Introduction
During the Cold War period, Japan was unable to participate in United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) because of its post-war anti- militarist pacifism, based on
its Peace Constitution. However, the Japanese government enacted the International Peace
Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in order to dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992. Japan’s participation
in UNTAC was a turning-point for Japan’s peacekeeping operations (PKO) policy. In order
to participate in UNPKOs, Japan’s pacifism shifted from one-nation pacifism constrained by
Article 9 of its Constitution to international pacifism based on the Preamble of the
Constitution (Akimoto, 2012; Ishizuka, 2005). During the 1990s, Japanese peacekeepers were
dispatched to the following UN peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian operations:
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Mozambique (1993), El Salvador (1994), the Congo (1994), the Golan Heights (1995, 1996),
Bosnia (1998), and Kosovo (1999) (Cabinet Office Japan, 2012).
In this context, the Japanese government attempted to make a greater contribution to
UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor based on the concept of “human security” as
one of the pillars of its foreign policy (Nasukawa, 2010), which “emerged as a tool for
coordinating various activities of international aid and peace operations ” (Shinoda, 2004, p.
1). Notably, as Gen Kikkawa (2007, p. 248) observed, Japan’s participation in the peace
operations in East Timor was “the first test case of Japan’s human security policy”.
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that military and constitutional limitations of Japan’s
peace operations are obvious because “Japan avoids genuine risks for peace by not
dispatching adequate manpower” (Lam, 2012, p. 193). Here, one simple but significant
research question immediately arises. To what extent were Japan’s peace operations in East
Timor consistent despite its military and constitutional constraints?
The purpose of this paper is to answer to this research question by systematically
examining Japan’s contributions to the international peace operations in East Timor. To this
end, this study employs timeline “sequence analysis” as a research method, which combines
and simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of
sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan’s commitments to the peace
operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement
(INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISET). Finally,
examined research data will be provided after the analysis of the four periods in order to
visualise and evaluate the sequence of Japan’s peace operations for human security of East
Timor.
Methodology
UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were comprehensive, and can be
divided into four major stages, as observed by Juichi Inada (2004, p. 229). This research
utilizes this classification to conduct “sequence analysis” of the four periods. First, the United
Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), led-by Special Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG) Ian Martin, was established on 11 June 1999 in order to observe the national
referendum. Second, the Australian- led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET),
under the command of Major General Peter Cosgrove, was initiated on 15 September 1999 as
a peace-enforcement operation authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Third, as a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
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Timor (UNTAET) led by SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello was set up on 25 October 1999.
Fourth, as a post- independence peacebuilding operation, the United Nations Mission of
Support to East Timor (UNMISET), under the leadership of Japanese SRSG Sukehiko
Hasegawa, was organized on 20 May 2002.
Simply put, the peace operations in East Timor consists of four phases as follows: 1)
preventive diplomacy (UNAMET as a preventive deployment), 2) peacemaking (INTERFET
as peace-enforcement), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) post-conflict peacebuilding
(UNMISET), as advocated by former United Nations Secretary General Boutros B. Ghali
(1992) in his essay, An Agenda For Peace.
Strictly speaking, however, Ghali (1992) proposed “preventive diplomacy” as a
peaceful action before conflict arises. Still, UNAMET can be categorized as preventive
diplomacy in that it was a “preventive deployment”, aiming to prevent conflict from
spreading during the ballot. INTERFET was not a UN force or UN-led peace enforcement
unit, but rather a multinational force authorized by a UN resolution. Nonetheless, it can be
categorized as UN-authorized “peace-enforcement” part of the “peacemaking” process.
UNTAET was established based on Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, but in
reality, this peace operation was a UNTAC-type “peacekeeping” operation. UNMISET and
the peace operations which followed can be categorized as post-conflict “peacebuilding”.
During the four periods, Japan made substantial contributions to the peace operations in East
Timor by dispatching civilian police to UNAMET in 1999, donating US$100 million to
INTERFET, sending civilian electoral monitors to UNTAET in 2001, and deploying
peacekeepers to UNTAET and UNMISET in 2002 (Cabinet Office Japan 2002-2004).
Needless to say, previous research has developed and employed sophisticated timeline
conflict analysis methods, such as “conflict escalation and de-escalation” to clarify nine
stages of conflict (Glasl, 1982), “progression of conflict” (Lederach, 1995), “conflict lifecycles” to analyse the birth/genesis, maturation/dynamics, death/solution of conflict (Galtung,
1996), the “life history of conflict” illustrated as a bell shaped curve (Lund, 1996), and the
“hourglass model” to investigate conflict containment, conflict settlement, and conflict
transformation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). In the examination of
international peace operations, some researchers have focused on peacekeeping operations
and other analysts have emphasized the significance of peacebuilding activities (Paris & Sisk,
2009; Francis, 2010). The earlier works provided applicable conflict analysis models and indepth investigations, but they are methodologically different from analyst to ana lyst.
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In contrast, this study integrates the analytical frameworks employed by the earlier
studies and simplifies them as a “sequence analysis method”. Normally, the term “sequence
analysis” is employed in the field of natural science, especially in genetics for the analysis of
a DNA sequence (Margulies & Birney, 2008). However, a timeline-based sequence analysis
can be applicable to political science (Fenno, 1986; Pierson, 2004), social science (Abbott,
1995), economics (Kanai, 2002), conflict analysis (Gottman, Markman, & Notarius, 1977),
and peacekeeping operations (Akimoto, 2012). The previous works in various academic
fields employed the sequential analysis in different ways, but they indicate that it is possible
to introduce the sequence analysis method into the field of peace and conflict studies. The
sequence analysis method in this paper examines the “four stages” of peace operations (1.
preventive deployment, 2. peace-enforcement, 3. peacekeeping, and 4. peacebuilding),
followed by analysed and visualised research data. The simple sequence of peace operations
in East Timor can be shown in Table 1 below.
Table1: Sequence of Four Stages of Peace Operations in East Timor
Year

Month

Stage of Peace Operations

Name of Peace Operations

1999

June

1. Preventive diplomacy

UNAMET set up (preventive deployment)

1999

August

1. Preventive diplomacy

Ballot conducted (cause of violent conflict)

1999

September

2. Peacemaking

INTERFET operated (peace-enforcement)

1999

October

3. Peacekeeping

UNTAET established (pre-independence)

2002

May

4. Peacebuilding

UNMISET, etc. (post-independence)

Note: For a detailed sequence analysis of the peace operations, see Table 2.

In order to apply the sequence analysis method, this paper investigates the data from
the Cabinet Office Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), and the United
Nations as primary sources. The in-depth sequence analysis of the primary sources will assist
in filling a gap in the earlier research regarding Japan’s contributions to international peace
missions in East Timor (e.g. Gorjao, 2002; Inada, Yoshida, & Isezaki, 2003; Inada, 2004;
Walton, 2004; Kikkawa, 2007; Llewelyn, Walton, & Kikkawa, 2009; Lam, 2012) and
answering to the core research question: to what extent Japan’s peace operations were
consistent and comprehensive for human security of East Timor.
Findings
Stage 1: Preventive Deployment: Japan’s Contribution to UNAMET
As an analysis of the first stage of the peace operations, Japan’s contribution to
“preventive diplomacy” for East Timor, will be overviewed in this section. From the
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perspective of a sequence analysis of international peace operations, UNAMET can be
categorized as a “preventive deployment” for independence. Normally, preventive diplomacy
is considered the prevention of conflict, and conflict already existed between East Timor and
Indonesia. Still, UNAMET was a UN peace operation to prevent violence during the
referendum period. In spite of the operation’s peaceful nature, Japan did not dispatch the SDF
and reluctantly sent three civilian police officers. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal
signed an agreement to resolve conflict over East Timor. An agreement was also reached on a
“direct, secret, and universal ballot” to determine the future of East Timor and to set up an
appropriate United Nations mission to oversee the process. On 11 June 1999, the UNSC
adopted Resolution 1246 to establish UNAMET (United Nations, 2001a).
In response to requests from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to
dispatch a political affairs officer and three civilian police officers from July 1999. In
addition, Japan contributed US$10.11 million to the UN Trust Fund, and provided 2,000
radios (MOFA, 1999a). As for the significance of Japan’s material contribution to UNAMET,
Ian Martin noted that “Asia’s economic collapse was UNAMET’s good fortune: stocks of
vehicles were available to be flown to East Timor from Tok yo” (Martin, 2001, p. 39). Due to
the death of police officer Haruyuki Takada during the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, a
cautious debate took place in Tokyo when three civilian police officers were dispatched to
East Timor (National Diet Library, 1999). In spite of the small number of participants, Japan
was recognized as a “major contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET” (Martin &
Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 130).
Ironically, the ballot in East Timor turned out to be a cause of conflict despite the
peace operation as a preventive measure. According to UNAMET, as many as 446,666 East
Timorese people registered for the ballot. The direct ballot in East Timor was carried out on
30 August 1999 and 98.6% of registered voters participated in the process. The result of the
vote was that 78.5% of voters rejected the proposed plan for special autonomy and 21.5%
voted in favour of being governed by the special authority of the Indonesian government
(United Nations, 2001b, 2001c; Martin, 2001, pp. 60, 90, 94). Immediately after the result of
the ballot was announced, however, anti- independence (pro- integration) groups burned down
houses and killed people. UNAMET spokesman David Wimhurst pointed out that UNAMET
was “defenceless” because “UNAMET had always been an unarmed mission and that
security had always been the province of the Indonesian authorities ” (United Nations, 1999b).
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By 5 September, as many as 150,000 people, one-quarter of the entire population, had
become refugees due to the violence and destruction. At this stage, 1,200 members of the
Australian Defense Forces began implementing military drills near Darwin in anticipation of
the UNSC adopting a resolution to authorize the armed intervention of multinational forces
(Ishizuka, 2008, pp. 121-122). Gross human rights violations, including the indiscriminate
killing of women and children, were conducted across East Timor in September. In addition,
as many as 70% of the buildings (90% in Dili) were destroyed and approximately 270,000
people, one-third of the entire population, became refugees (Takahashi, Masuoka, & Monju,
2000, pp. 7-10, 13-20). UNAMET was able to hold the ballot but it could not prevent “crimes
against humanity”, and major cities in East Timor became “killing fields” (Dunn, 2001).
These mass killings and “human insecurity” (Umegaki, Thiesmeyer, & Watanbe, 2009) in
East Timor were beyond the mandate of UNAMET and necessitated military intervention by
INTERFET.
Stage 2: Peace-enforcement: Japan’s Financial Contribution to INTERFET
In the second stage of the peace operation (peacemaking/peace-enforcement), it is
clarified that Japan made a financial contribution to INTERFET as a peace-enforcement
operation in East Timor. On 15 September, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, recognising
the security situation in East Timor as a threat to peace and security. The resolution
authorized the establishment of a multinational force (United Nations, 1999a). INTERFET
was established to “restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET
in carrying out its task (and within force capabilities) and to facilitate humanitarian assistance
operations” (Cobb, 1999). It is noteworthy that Resolution 1264 legitimatized the use of
force, stipulating “all necessary measures to fulfil [its] mandate” (Ibid).
The approximate number of the “coalitions of the willing” soldiers was 13,000,
comprising troops from Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the
United States, and Australia (Dee, 2001, p. 1). The mission of INTERFET troops was to
crack down on and disarm the East Timorese militia, which had been created by the
Indonesian army (Isezaki, 2004, pp. 64-65). In this sense, the INTERFET mission was more
difficult to carry out than other UN peace operations.
Predictably, Sadaaki Numata, the MOFA Press Secretary, was vague on the issue of
dispatching the SDF to INTERFET, stating that “I think it is a bit premature for me to go
further into the details of what sort of possible participation there might be in the United
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Nations Peacekeeping Forces” (MOFA, 1999b). It is plausible that Numata avoided
mentioning a SDF dispatch to INTERFET because of Japan’s constitutional restraints. The
dispatch of the SDF to multinational military operations was technically impossible, and
therefore, the Japanese government decided to support the launch of INTERFET by
financially providing a fund of US$100 million. Notably, the entire contribution to the
INTERFET Trust Fund was US$107 million (Dee, 2001, p. 10; McDermott, 1999).
In response to the worsening security situation in East Timor, the Japanese
government decided to contribute an additional US$2 million as an emergency assistance
fund. One million dollars was donated to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and another million was contributed to the World Food Programme (WFP)
(MOFA, 1999c). This immediate response from Japan indicates that the Japanese government
believed that it was constitutionally impossible to dispatch the SDF to join a multinational
force. At a press conference, the MOFA Press Secretary rejected the possibility of a dispatch
of the SDF to INTERFET on the grounds of a lack of legal framework (MOFA, 1999d).
To make contributions to UN peace operations in East Timor, the Japanese
government started to reconsider its conventional PKO policy. These decisions by the
Japanese government regarding a non- military contribution to the security crisis of postballot East Timor were made based on the PKO Law. While making decisions on
humanitarian aid, the Japanese government attempted to lift the freeze on peacekeeping
forces (PKF) operations. In this context, the LDP, the Liberal Party, and Komeito signed the
“Three-Party Accord” on 4 October 1999 (Shoji, 2005). On 14 October, the Japanese
government announced plans to dispatch a field study mission, made up of officials from the
Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, the Prime Minister’s Office,
MOFA, and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to East Timor. The Japanese government
hoped to contribute towards the transportation of UNHCR goods by plane through 150 staff
of the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) (MOFA, 1999e). Based on the PKO Law, the
government contributed assistance goods, such as 500 tents, 9,000 blankets, 11,140 sleeping
mats, 20,000 water containers, and 5,120 plastic sheets for the displaced East Timorese
(MOFA, 1999f). In response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese government also
decided to dispatch four aircraft (C-130H) as transport planes for the ASDF and a multipurpose assistance plane (U-4) with six liaison officers between Surabaya (Java Island) and
Kupang (West Timor) (MOFA, 1999g). In addition to the material assistance, the Japanese
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government contributed US$100 million to the UN Trust Fund, and the government,
moreover, explored options to dispatch the SDF to East Timor in post-INTERFET operations.
Stage 3: Peacekeeping: Japan’s Incre mental Contribution to UNTAET
In the third stage of the peace operation (peacekeeping), Japan’s contribution became
gradually active, and finally, Japanese peacekeepers were dispatched to UNTAET. The
mandate of the UNTAET operation was based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which
includes “peace-enforcement”. Yet, the UNTAET operation can be categorized as an
UNTAC-type peacekeeping operation. Although the nature of UNTAET was peacekeeping
rather than coercive action, Japan could not at first deploy the SDF to UNTAET due to
constitutional constraints. Instead, Japan dispatched the SDF to Indonesia and West Timor to
support UNHCR for the relief of East Timorese IDP during this period. On 20 October 1999,
the Indonesian government decided to withdraw from East Timor and the UNSC set up
UNTAET based on Resolution 1272, which was adopted on 25 October 1999 (United
Nations, 1999c, 2001d).
The word “Timorization” became a slogan to empower East Timor and the nationbuilding process, and was also part of a process of “democratization” (Isezaki, 2004, p. 46).
UNTAET was composed of three pillars: the military, Humanitarian Assistance and
Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER), and Governance and Public Administration. HAER was
conducted under the leadership of Akira Takahashi, who later became Special Adviser on
Development and Humanitarian Affairs to the SRSG. HAER was “instrumental in
coordinating a range of relief and humanitarian organizations and working with the East
Timorese to determine relief assistance priorities” (Smith & Dee, 2003, pp. 62-63). Unlike
PKF activities, humanitarian assistance is an area to which Japanese peacekeepers could
make a substantial contribution. Takahashi’s leadership in HAER assisted Japan’s
contribution in the field of humanitarian aid.
On 26 October 1999, MOFA Press Secretary Numata announced that Japan was
willing to make a contribution to UNTAET in response to the adoption of UNSC Resolution
1272, although he did not mention the possibility of the dispatch of the SDF to UNTAET
(MOFA, 1999h). Akira Takahashi, Special Advisor to the President of the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), was appointed by the UN Secretary General as the Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency
Rehabilitation of UNTAET (MOFA, 1999i). Takeshi Kamiyama, a MOFA official, was
appointed as a senior civil affairs officer to take charge of the Environmental Protection Unit
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of the Governance and Public Administration Component of UNTAET (MOFA, 2000).
These appointments of Japanese officials to pivotal positions in UNTAET reflected MOFA’s
diplomatic efforts to make a contribution to peace operations in East Timor.
On 19 November 1999, in response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese
government decided to dispatch 113 ASDF members to Indonesia and West Timor (Kupang)
to transport aid materials. The ASDF left from the Komaki base and transported 400 tons of
material, and UNHCR appreciated Japan’s participation, which made it possible to provide
aid for 120,000 East Timorese refugees (JDA, 2000, pp. 175-176). Yoshio Mochizuki, a
Parliamentary Secretary for MOFA, visited East Timor on 11 April 2001 to meet the leaders
of East Timor, including President Xanana Gusmao and Vice-President Jose Ramos-Horta. In
these meetings, Mochizuki emphasized Japan’s contribution in the three fields of agriculture,
human resources development, and infrastructure (MOFA, 2001a). The dispatch of ASDF
personnel to Indonesia and West Timor and Mochizuki’s visit to East Timor show the nonmilitary and indirect nature of Japan’s contribution to the UNTAET operation.
In response to a request from the United Nations, the Japanese government dispatched
19 civilian election observers to the Constituent Assembly of East Timor based on the PKO
Law (MOFA, 2001b). With regard to the election, the Japanese government decided to make
an extra emergency contribution of US$1,191,000 through the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) (MOFA, 2001c). On 30 August 2001, Constituent Assembly Elections
were held with a voter turnout rate of 91.3%. 88 Assembly members were elected as part of a
peaceful democratic process (MOFA, 2001d).
Significantly, the Koizumi government revised the 1992 PKO Law on 14 December
2001 to make SDF’s participation in PKF possible (Cabinet Office Japan, 2001). In February
2002, in response to strong requests and expectations from the United Nations and the leaders
of East Timor, the Japanese government decided to dispatch 680 Ground Self Defense Force
(GSDF) personnel in engineer units and 10 PKF headquarters personnel to peace operations
conducted by UNTAET (MOFA, 2001e, 2002a; Cabinet Office Japan, 2002-2004). In
response to a further request from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to
dispatch eight electoral observers to the Presidential Election to be held on 14 April 2002 in
East Timor (MOFA, 2002b). In the same month (29 April), Prime Minister Jun’ichirō
Koizumi visited East Timor to inspect an SDF engineer unit serving in UNTAET (MOFA,
2002c). For Japan, participation in UNTAET, the Constituent Assembly Elections, and the
Presidential Election without casualties was a symbol of success. If SDF personnel had been
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killed, the Japanese government would have had to consider the withdrawal of the SDF.
Moreover, the UNTAET operation itself was generally successful (Ishizuka, 2008, pp. 132133).
Stage 4: Peacebuilding: Japan’s Contribution to Post-independence Operations
In the fourth stage of the peace operation (peacebuilding), Japan, on the basis of its
“human security” policy, maximized its contribution to the peace operation in East Timor.
UNMISET, under the leadership of SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa from Japan, can be
categorized as a post-conflict peacebuilding operation. Based on new diplomatic concepts
such as “human security” and the “consolidation of peace”, the Japanese government
dispatched a total of 2,300 SDF personnel to East Timor. In addition to UNMISET, Japan
made a contribution to the subsequent UN peacebuilding operations in East Timor. East
Timor gained independence from Indonesia on 20 May 2002 and UNTAET was replaced by
UNMISET based on UNSC Resolution 1410 (United Nations, 2005a). The deployment of up
to 5,000 military personnel, including 120 military observers, and 1,250 civilian police
officers, was authorized based on the UNSC resolution (United Nations, 2005b).
The independence of East Timor allowed Japanese peacekeepers to play a greater
role. The Koizumi government decided at a Cabinet meeting to reassign a Japan GSDF
Engineer Unit of 680 members (including seven female personnel) and PKF headquarters
personnel, all of whom had been dispatched to UNTAET, for the post- independence nationbuilding operations of UNMISET (MOFA, 2002d). The JDA organised 295 vehicles for the
GSDF, two fleets for transportation and escort for the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF),
and seven C-130H transportation aircrafts and a U-4 multifunctional support aircraft for the
ASDF. The SDF was stationed in main cities, such as Dili, Maliana, Suai, and Oecusse (Pante
Macassar), to construct roads and bridges and to offer support with water and food supplies in
collaboration with the Korean forces (JDA, 2002, pp. 214-218; JDA, 2003a, p. 215; JDA,
2003b, p.12).
Japan’s commitment to peacebuilding operations in East Timor gradually decreased
as the UNMISET mission was carried out. The changeover of Japanese peacekeepers was
conducted in the presence of Toshio Kojima, Parliamentary Secretary for the JDA, on 13
March 2002. Responding to a request from the United Nations, the SDF Engineer Unit was
reduced from 680 personnel to 522 (MOFA, 2003a). On June 14 2002 in New York, UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan announced the appointment of Sukehiro Hasegawa as Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary General and Deputy Head of Mission (MOFA,
Volume 20, Number 2

161

Peace and Conflict Studies
2002e). The United Nations decided to extend the mandate of UNMISET in accordance with
UNSC Resolution 1480 until 20 May 2004, and the Japanese government also prolonged the
term of the GSDF engineer group and headquarters personnel operating in East Timor
(MOFA, 2003b). In line with the gradual conclusion of UNMISET, the number of SDF
troops was reduced from 522 to 405. Prime Minister Koizumi, in talks with East Timorese
President Gusmao in Tokyo on 23 February 2004, promised to make a further contribution of
approximately one million US dollars to East Timor (Prime Minister of Japan and His
Cabinet, 2004a).
After the mandate of UNMISET expired on 20 May 2004, the Koizumi government
decided on the full withdrawal of the fourth SDF personnel. Even so, the mandate of
UNMISET was extended from 20 May 2004 for a maximum of one year (MOFA, 2004a).
The total number of SDF personnel dispatched to UNMISET amounted to approximately
2,300 SDF troops, including 25 female personnel. The nation-building activities of the SDF
consisted of 120 projects that included the maintenance and repair of roads, bridges and
infrastructure, levelling land of the fields for elementary schools, and the construction of
waste disposal facilities (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2004b). Through the Trust
Fund for human security, the Japanese government decided to support the “100 Schools
Project: Improving the Quality of Primary Education in East Timor” conducted by the United
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) (MOFA, 2004b).
Following the expiration of the mandate of UNMISET on 20 May 2005, the United
Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a UN special political mission, was established
with a one-year mandate. In April 2006, ex-national army troops dropped out of the army as a
result of discrimination and the demonstrations. The East Timorese government intervened
with the national army, and approximately 100,000 people became IDPs, around 60% of the
entire population of Dili. In response, the Japanese government decided to provide
emergency contribution of US$5 million for an emergency shelter, water, and health care
(MOFA, 2006a, 2006b).
After the UNOTIL operation expired, UNSC Resolution 1704 authorized the
establishment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).
Responding to a request from the United Nations, two Japanese civilian police officers were
dispatched to UNMIT (Cabinet Office Japan, 2007). For presidential and parliamentary
elections in East Timor, the Japanese government provided an emergency grant aid of
US$723,855 though the UNDP and dispatched 14 electoral observers (MOFA, 2007a, 2007b,
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2007c). In spite of all these peacebuilding activities, the security situation in East Timor was
not stable and Australian Defense Forces remained until the security situation improved
(MOFA, 2008). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the UN peace operations failed in East
Timor. Japan did not stop its contribution to the peace operations and dispatched two
peacekeepers for cease-fire monitoring operations to UNMIT in 2010. In response to the
extension of the UNMIT mandate to 31 December 2012, the Japanese government also
extended the duration of its commitment until 28 February 2013 so that Japan could make an
extra commitment in case of an emergency (MOFA, 2010, 2012; United Nations, 2012).
Discussion: Examined Data in the Sequence Analysis
As clarified by the sequence analysis of Japan’s commitments to the peace operations
in East Timor, although Japan could not make a direct military commitment to “national
security” of East Timor through INTERFET, it donated US$100 million to the INTERFET
operation, and continuous and substantial contributions were made by the Japanese
government for “human security” of the East Timorese people as shown in Table 2 below
(“PKO”, here, means general PKO missions regardless of stages).
Table 2: Sequence of Japan’s Peace Operations for Human Security of East Timor
Start of
Name of
PKO Humanitarian Election
Contributions
Operations
Operations and Details
Relief
Observation in kind, etc.
June 1999
Contribution in kind to
o
(Stage 1)
UNAMET
(US$10.11 million to the UN
Trust Fund)
(2,000 radios)
July 1999
International
o
(Stage 1)
Peace Cooperation
Assignment in East
Timor (A political affairs officer
and three civilian police officers)
Sep. 1999
INTERFET (US$100
o
(Stage 2)
million)
Emergency
o
Humanitarian Assistance
for East Timor
(US$2 million)
(US$1 million to
UNHCR and WFP)
Oct. 1999
Contribution in kind to
o
(Stage 3)
UNHCR for the Relief
of East Timorese
Displaced Persons
Nov. 1999
International Peace
o
(Stage 3)
Cooperation Assignment
for East Timorese
Displaced Persons (150
ASDF) (500 tents, 9,000
blankets, 11,140
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Aug. 2001
(Stage 3)

Feb. 2002
(Stage 4)

Apr. 2002
(Stage 4)

May. 2004
(Stage 4)
June 2006
(Stage 4)

July 2006
(Stage 4)

Jan. 2007
(Stage 4)
Mar. 2007
(Stage 4)

Sep. 2010Dec. 2012
(Stage 4)

sleeping mats,
20,000 water containers,
5,120 plastic sheets)
International Peace
o
Cooperation Assignment
in East Timor
(19 civilian election
observers)
(US$1,191,000
through UNDP)
International Peace
o
Cooperation Assignment
in East Timor
(680 GSDF and 10 PKF to
UNAMET)
(2,300 GSDF in total to
UNMISET)
International Peace
o
Cooperation Assignment
for East Timorese
Election Observation
100 Schools Project
o
(UNICEF)
Emergency
o
Humanitarian
Assistance for
East Timor
(US$2 million)
Emergency Grant Aid
o
through International
Organizations for IDPs
from Unrest in
Timor-Leste
International Peace
o
Cooperation Assignment
in Timor-Leste
International Peace
o
Cooperation Assignment for
Timor-Leste Election
Observation
(14 electoral observers
and US$723,855
through UNDP)
International Peace
o
Cooperation Assignment
in Democratic Republic
of Timor-Leste
(2 peacekeepers
for cease-fire monitoring to
UNMIT)
(Combined Data from Cabinet Office Japan, JDA, MOFA, and the United Nations)

As the data displayed above demonstrate, Japan’s contribution to the peace
operations, particularly dispatch of the peacekeepers to East Timor, became active after the
Japanese government adopted the human security concept as a pillar of its diplomatic policy.
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Simply, the sequence represents that Japan’s peace operations in East Timor were consistent
and comprehensive for human security (freedom from fear and want). Moreover, as
represented in Table 3, Japan was the third largest donor for peacebuilding in East Timor
following Australia and Portugal (2005 and 2006). This fact means that Japan made
significant contributions to human security of East Timor especially in terms of “freedom
from want”.
Table 3: Percentage of Top 3 Donors for Peacebuilding in East Timor (2005 and 2006)
Name
Number
Number
% of CPA % of CPA
% of CPA
Total % of
of
of
of Donors
by
by
by
CPA
Country
Donors
over
Top
Top 2
Top 3
by Top
90% CPA
Donor
Donors
Donors
3 Donors
East Timor 21
10
Australia
Portugal
Japan
Total
(22%)
(20%)
(15%)
(57%)
(OECD/DAC, 2008. p. 46)

As well as the financial contribution (freedom from want), Japan made significant
contributions to human security of East Timor in terms of maintenance of stability (freedom
from fear). Normally, the Japanese government has focused on financial contributio ns as its
human security policy, but the case of East Timor reveals that Japan’s human security policy
has become more active and contributory to freedom from fear. Indeed, Japan’s peace
operations in East Timor were more comprehensive and large-scale than those in Cambodia
(Akimoto, 2012; Walton & Akimoto, 2013). This fact can be visualised by comparing the
case of Japan’s peace operations in East Timor with the other peace operations conducted by
Japanese peacekeepers as shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Percentage of Japan’s Peace Operations for East Timor of Total Operations

Japan's Peace Operations in East Timor
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
PKO

Humanitarian
Relief

Election
Observation

Contributions in
Kind

(Modified Data from Table 2 and Cabinet Office Japan)
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As Figure 1 shows, the percentage of Japan’s commitment to peace operations in East
Timor in comparison with the other operations is relatively high (31% in PKO, 50% in
humanitarian relief, 33% in election observation, 19% in contributions in kind). Japan
dispatched its peacekeepers to peace operations (PKO) in Cambodia, Mozambique, El
Salvador, the Golan Heights, Nepal, Sudan, Haiti, and South Sudan, but the peace operations
(PKO) in East Timor account for as many as 30% of the total. The figure, especially that of
PKO, indicates that Japan’s peace operations in East Timor were more consistent, large-scale
and comprehensive than the other peace operations conducted by the Japanese government
for human security (particularly “freedom from fear”).
In short, not only did Japan make financial and material contributions to “freedom
from want” of the East Timorese, but the Japanese peacekeepers contributed to “freedom
from fear” of the people as well. Although Japan could not make a military commitment to
national security during the INTERFET operation, its contributions to human security of East
Timor were seamless and comprehensive, including peace operations, humanitarian relief,
election observation, and contributions in kind. Japan’s military and constitutional limitations
could be overcome by cooperating with other countries, which are experienced in peace
operations including peace-enforcement. In sum, the analysed data indicate the fact that Japan
made holistic and consistent commitments to the peace operations for human security of East
Timor.
Conclusion
This paper has examined Japan’s contributions to the four stages of peace operations
in East Timor through the application of sequence analysis. By utilising the sequence analysis
method, the complexity of the multi-dimensional peace operations and Japan’s contributions
in East Timor has been clarified. As demonstrated by the data supplied in Table 2 and 3, as
well as Figure 1, Japan has made long-term and large-scale contributions to the peace
operations in East Timor.
In the post-Cold War period, Japan explored making contributions to UN-authorized
peace operations in East Timor. Japan’s first contribution was made to UNAMET as
“preventive deployment”. Japan dispatched a political affairs officer and three civilian police
officers and made a substantial material contribution to UNAMET. Nonetheless, as a result of
the 1999 ballot, an armed conflict broke out and approximately one-fourth of the East
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Timorese population became refugees. This period represents a culmination of “conflict
escalation” (Glasl, 1982).
The armed conflict in East Timor necessitated military intervention by INTERFET, as
“peace-enforcement” for the sake of “conflict containment” (Ramsbotham, et al., 2005).
Australian-led multinational forces contributed to peace-enforcement as part of the
peacemaking process. Although the multinational forces were not a formal UN force, their
military operations were authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1264. While Japan
could not make a direct military contribution to “national security” of East Timor, owing to
Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, it did make a financia l contribution to INTERFET,
UNHCR, and the WFP.
The mandate of UNTAET as a peacekeeping operation included peace-enforcement
based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Therefore, in 1999 Japan dispatched the SDF not to
East Timor but to Indonesia and West Timor in order to support UNHCR. During the
UNTAET operation, Japan made humanitarian and legal contributions. Indeed, HAER, one
of the three pillars of UNTAET, was carried out under the leadership of Akira Takahashi. In
addition, electoral observers were dispatched to the Constituent Assembly Elections in 2001.
Finally, in February 2002, 680 Japanese peacekeepers and 10 PKF headquarters personnel
were deployed to UNTAET. The Japanese government revised the PKO Law in order to
dispatch the SDF to peace operations during the “conflict termination” period (Lund, 1996).
In consequence of UNTAET, the Koizumi government sent more peacekeepers to
UNMISET as a peacebuilding operation led by SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa. On the basis of
diplomatic concepts such as “human security” and the “consolidation of peace”, Japan
dispatched about a total of 2,300 peacekeepers to UNMISET, which was the largest number
in the history of Japan’s PKO policy. Furthermore, Japan has continued supporting postindependence peacebuilding operations, such as UNOTIL and UNMIT. Those UN peace
operations literally involved “state-building” as a part of peacebuilding operations (Paris &
Sisk, 2009). Thus, although it seems to be relatively simplistic, the sequence analysis method
has contributed to clarifying the complicated Japan’s peace missions. In conclusion, the
findings discovered by sequence analysis substantiate that Japan’s contributions to peace
operations in East Timor were incremental, seamless, and comprehensive despite the
technical limitations.
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